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Cicciaro: Equal Protection

EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE GIFTED AND TALENTED
PROGRAM
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
Matter of R.B. v. Department of Education of the City of New York1
(decided August 1, 2013)
The parents of children who were seeking admission into the
“Gifted and Talented” (“G&T”) program in the New York City public school system claimed that the admission process “violate[d] the
Equal Protection [C]lause of the New York State Constitution by giving preference to applicants who already ha[d] siblings in the G&T
program.”2 The New York Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution.3 The
court stated, “a policy withstands a constitutional challenge if it ‘rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose . . . .’ ”4
The court concluded that the Department of Education’s policy of
admitting students into the G&T program was within its discretion.5
I.

HISTORY

In 1931, the United States Department of Education created
the first federal program for gifted education.6 The program laid the
foundation for future programs but lacked specific legislative authority.7 In 1950, the National Science Foundation Act was enacted by

1

No. 100738-13, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3412, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2013).
Id.
3
Id. at *14.
4
Id. at *15.
5
Id. at *17.
6
Charles J. Russo, Unequal Educational Opportunities For Gifted Students: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 727, 733 (2001).
7
Id.
2
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Congress.8 The act “not only directed resources toward the development of the sciences and basic research, but for the first time focused
federal attention on the nation’s gifted and talented.”9 The act encouraged careers in mathematics and physical sciences.10 However,
from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, the focus was on desegregation in schools, not gifted education.11 In the 1950s, programs for the
gifted were diverted because of the focus on disadvantaged students
and the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.12
Finally, in 1970, The Gifted and Talented Children’s Education Assistance Act was passed.13 The act “gave the first federal statutory
definition of the term ‘gifted,’ called for the development of model
programs, and made programs eligible for federal financial assistance.”14
The Commissioner of Education assessed the programs for
the gifted and submitted his report to Congress in October of 1972.15
The report pushed for the support and development of gifted programs.16 As a result, the Office of the Gifted and Talented was created in 1974.17 Additionally, funds were made available to education
agencies for the gifted.18 Then, in 1978, The Gifted and Talented
Children’s Education Assistance Act extended funding to provide
separate programs for gifted students.19 However, the act was repealed in 1981 by President Reagan when the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act was passed, and the Office of Gifted and Talented
was closed.20
Education reform was brought back into Congress’s focus in
8

42 U.S.C. § 1871 (1950).
Id. (quoting Jeffrey J. Zettel, The Education of Gifted and Talented Children from a
Federal Perspective, in JOSEPH BALLARD ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: ITS LEGAL
AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 51 (1982)).
10
Id.
11
Russo, supra note 6, at 734.
12
Id. at 737-38 (stating that this act was “vital and necessary in looking after the needs of
disadvantaged students”); 20 U.S.C. § 6391 (2002) (stating the purpose was to support migratory children).
13
Russo, supra note 6, at 738.
14
Id. at 738-39.
15
Id. at 739.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Russo, supra note 6, at 740.
19
Id.
20
Id.
9
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the 1990s when the Jacob Javits Gifted and Talented Students Act
(“JGTSA”) of 1994 was passed.21 The JGTSA updated and expanded
previous acts and provided “priority funding for programs to serve
gifted students who are economically disadvantaged, speak limited
English, or have disabilities.”22 The JGTSA, however, did not mandate that gifted programs be created.23 The most recent piece of legislation was The Gifted and Talented Education Act that was proposed in 2001.24 Since then, the states have taken over the support
and funding of gifted programs.25
II.

BACKGROUND

The New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) proposed two changes to the G&T program in the New York City public
schools.26 First, the DOE proposed to eliminate preferential treatment given to children that had siblings already in the G&T program
(“sibling preference”).27 Second, the DOE proposed to change the
way in which the percentile scoring was to be calculated.28 The DOE
followed Education Law § 2590-g29 and posted notice to the public
on its website of the proposed changes and invited public comment
about such changes.30 The changes were also posted in the G&T
Handbook for the 2012-2013 academic year.31 The proposed change

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

20 U.S.C. §§ 8031-37 (repealed Jan. 8, 2002).
Russo, supra note 6, at 741.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 742.
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-g(8)(a) (McKinney 2009):
Prior to the approval of any proposed item listed in subdivision one of
this section, undertake a public review process to afford the public an
opportunity to submit comments on the proposed item. Such public review process shall include notice of the item under city board consideration which shall be made available to the public, including via the city
board’s official internet website, and specifically circulated to all community superintendents, community district education councils, community boards, and school based management teams, at least forty-five days
in advance of any city board vote on such item.

Id.
30
31

Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *4.
Id.
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to the scoring methodology received negative public comments;
therefore, the DOE decided not to implement the change until further
analysis was completed.32 The proposed elimination of the sibling
preference also largely received comments of opposition.33 The DOE
notified the interested parties, all families who had submitted a request for testing, of its decision to “use the ‘same process and policy’
that had been used” in the previous year.34 This admission process
consisted of placing, in citywide programs, siblings in or above the
97th percentile of currently enrolled students first, and in district programs, siblings in or above the 90th percentile of currently enrolled
students first.35 Once all eligible siblings were placed, then all nonsibling applicants were placed based on their percentile rank. 36 If
there was a tie or an insufficient number of seats, there would be a
random drawing to determine who would receive an offer.37
In Matter of R.B., the parents (“petitioners”) of the children
that wanted to be accepted into the G&T program brought suit
against the DOE for violating the Equal Protection Clause. Under the
Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution Article I,
§ 11, “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof.”38 The court stated that the
Equal Protection Clause was no broader than the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.39 The petitioners classified their children as a “suspect” class in order to receive a strict
scrutiny review.40 However, the court stated the classification for
strict scrutiny “refers to a party’s racial or national background, and
not to the child’s status as a sibling.”41 If there is no “suspect” classification, the level of judicial scrutiny does not rise and rational basis
32

The G&T Handbook provides the community with information about the program. Id.
at *5, *7.
33
Id. at *5.
34
Id. at *7.
35
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *7-8.
36
Id. at *8.
37
Id.
38
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
39
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *14-15.
40
Id. at *15. Strict scrutiny is when the court reviews a classification to determine whether the law or regulation is supported by a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest. Strict scrutiny is applied when a fundamental right is at issue or involves a suspect class. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Regents of Univ.
of Califormia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
41
Id.
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review applies, which provides that “a policy withstands a constitutional challenge if it ‘rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated
state purpose . . . .’ ”42
The petitioners challenged the DOE’s admission process,
claiming that it was arbitrary and capricious and that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause.43 The petitioners specifically asserted that
“the DOE’s methodology gives ‘preferential treatment’ to children
with siblings already enrolled in G&T programs in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution.”44 The court recognized that the DOE only needed to “demonstrate a rational basis
for its admission policy.”45 The court reasoned that the DOE’s rational, legitimate state purpose was that the sibling preference was in
place to reduce the burden on families with two or more siblings having to attend two different schools.46 Therefore, there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause.47
The petitioners’ argument that the admission process was arbitrary and capricious, according to § 7803(3) of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules,48 was rejected by the court.49 The court stated that the statutory right of the petitioners was a “right to a ‘sound
basic education’ and not to a particular type of educational program.”50 Additionally, the court found that the school administrators
had broad discretion in determining the design of educational programs51 and that the judiciary should not interfere unless there was a
violation of the law.52 The court concluded that the sibling preference and scoring methodology were “an educational policy that
f[e]ll[] within the DOE’s discretion.”53 The court held that although
the policies “may not be perfect,” the petitioners did not establish that

42
Id. (quoting Archbishop Walsh High School v. Section VI of the N.Y. State Pub. High
School Athletic Ass’n, 666 N.E.2d 521 (1996)).
43
Id. at *9.
44
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *10.
45
Id. at *15.
46
Id.
47
Id. at *14.
48
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 2003).
49
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *15-16.
50
Id. at *16 (citing New York City Liberties Union v. State of New York, 824 N.E.2d 947
(N.Y. 2005)); see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 2013).
51
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *16.
52
Id.
53
Id. at *17.
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the policies were arbitrary or capricious.54
The court in Matter of R.B. cited the case Korematsu v. United States.55 In Korematsu, the Court stated that “the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”56 The court in Matter of
R.B. also referred to the case Esler v. Walters,57 which established
that the State’s Equal Protection Clause is no broader than the Fourteenth Amendment.58 Additionally, the court in Matter of R.B. cited
the case Archbishop Walsh High School v. Section VI of the New
York State Public High School Athletic Association.59 In Archbishop,
the court found that absent a “suspect” classification that raised the
level of judicial scrutiny, a policy withstands a constitutional challenge if it “rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not . . . violat[e] the Equal Protection
Clause.”60
The DOE argued that relief should not be granted to the petitioners because they failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 61 The
DOE claimed that pursuant to Education Law § 310(7),62 the petitioners should have appealed to the State Commissioner of Education.63 The court disagreed with the DOE.64 The court stated that the
language in the statute suggested a remedy; it did not mandate the petitioner to seek relief from the State Commissioner of Education.65
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Id. at 216.
437 N.E.2d 1090 (N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 1094.
666 N.E.2d 521 (N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 523.
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *11.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310(7) (McKinney 2013);
Any party conceiving himself aggrieved may appeal by petition to the
commissioner of education who is hereby authorized and required to examine and decide the same; and the commissioner of education may also
institute such proceedings as are authorized under this article. The petition may be made in consequence of any action: By any other official act
or decision of any officer, school authorities, or meetings concerning any
other matter under this chapter, or any other act pertaining to common
schools.

Id.
63
64
65

Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *11.
Id.
Id. at *11-12.
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The court also recognized that there was an exception to seeking relief from the State Commissioner of Education where “pursuit of the
administrative remedy may be futile or lead to irreparable harm due
to processing delays.”66 The court stated that there was a “need for
prompt certainty as to the schooling arrangements for their children
for th[at] September.”67 Thus, the court held that the petitioners did
not need to pursue administrative remedies before commencing the
proceeding.68
III.

FEDERAL APPROACH
A.

Supreme Court

In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,69 a Seattle school district voluntarily adopted a student
assignment plan to determine which schools certain children could
attend when too many students listed the same school as their first
choice for attendance.70 The district had three “tiebreakers” to select
the students who would attend the oversubscribed school.71 The first
tiebreaker gave children who already had a sibling enrolled in the
chosen school admission to that school.72 The second tiebreaker was
dependent on the racial composition of the chosen school and the
race of the individual student.73 If the chosen school was not within
the percentage of 41% white and 59% “non-white,” then the tiebreaker selected the student whose race “w[ould] serve to bring the
school into balance.”74 The final tiebreaker, if necessary, was the
student’s geographic proximity of the school to their residence.75
Parents Involved in Community Schools (“Parents Involved”)
was a nonprofit corporation of the parents of children who had been
or could be denied admission to their chosen school because of their
66
Id. at 12 (citing Matter of Cmty. Sch. Bd. Nine v. Crew, 648 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div.
1st Dep’t 1996)).
67
Id.
68
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *12.
69
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
70
Id. at 709-10.
71
Id. at 711.
72
Id. at 711-12.
73
Id. at 712.
74
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712.
75
Id.
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race.76 The Ninth Circuit held that the Seattle school district’s plan
was “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”77
The Supreme Court recognized that when “the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”78
The Court found two interests that qualify as compelling for
purposes of the strict scrutiny test.79 The first is the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination, and
the other is the interest in diversity in higher education.80 The Court
found that race was the determinative factor alone and race was not
“considered as part of a broader effort to achieve ‘exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.’ ”81 The school districts were using racial balancing for the purpose of improving demographic equality, not educational benefits.82 The Supreme Court
overruled the Ninth Circuit’s decision stating, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.”83 The Supreme Court held that the school district did not “carr[y]
the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this . . . .”84
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger.85
The University of Michigan Law School had an admission policy that
sought to achieve diversity in the student body.86 The policy required
admissions officials to assess applicants based on a range of information, including the applicant’s essay, which explained how he or
she would contribute to law school life and diversity; letters of recommendation; the Law School Admission Test; and undergraduate
grade point average.87 The admission policy “reaffirm[ed] the Law
School’s commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American students,
who otherwise might not be represented in the student body in mean76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 713.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 720.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720.
Id. at 720-22.
Id. at 723 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003)).
Id. at 726.
Id. at 748.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id. at 306.
Id.
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ingful numbers.”88 The Law School claimed that “[b]y enrolling a
‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students, the policy
seeks to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School’s character and to the legal profession.”89 The petitioner, a white female,
claimed that the respondents violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the Law School had discriminated against her based on her
race.90 The petitioner alleged that “the Law School use[d] race as a
‘predominant’ factor, giving applicants belonging to certain minority
groups a significantly greater chance of admission than students with
similar credentials from disfavored racial groups; and that respondents had no compelling interest to justify that use of race.”91
The Court stated that “all racial classifications imposed by
government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’ ”92 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that strict scrutiny is applied to racial classifications “to ‘smoke’ out illegitimate uses of race
by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”93 The Court recognized that it
was following its precedent by showing deference to the university’s
academic decisions.94 The Court found that the Law School’s admission policy considered many factors, race only being one of those
factors, to create a diverse student body.95 Finally, the Court held
that the Law School’s use of race in its admission policy furthered the
compelling interest of the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.96 Justice Thomas stated, in his concurring and
dissenting opinion, that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
the use of unseemingly “legacy preferences” or many other kinds of
arbitrary admissions procedures, but it does prohibit classifications
made on the basis of race.97

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Id.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
Id.
Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. at 227).
Id.
Id. at 328.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Lower Courts

The lower federal courts have addressed admission policies,
such as a past academic achievement and a sibling preference. The
Ninth Circuit reviewed an admission standard in Berkelman v. San
Francisco United School District.98 The question before the court in
Berkelman was whether an admission standard substantially furthered
the school’s purpose.99 The admission policy was based on the students’ past academic achievement standard.100 The court held that
the school district’s past academic achievement standard substantially
furthered the purpose of providing the best education possible for the
students in the school district.101 The court recognized that “[t]he
cutoff is the result of space and budget limitations, not the result of a
perfect determination of who can and who cannot benefit from the
program.”102 Students who were not admitted to the program were
not “denied a quality education nor relegated to an inadequate
school.”103
In 1986, the district court decided United States v. Yonkers
Board of Education.104 The Yonkers Board of Education created an
Educational Improvement Plan, which the plaintiffs objected to.105
The Board then submitted a modified plan.106 The modified plan included a sibling preference for admission to magnet schools.107
When an applicant met all of the admission criteria, preference would
be given to siblings of children already enrolled in magnet schools.108
The court ordered the Board’s modified plan effective.109 Both of the
Federal lower courts found that the admission policies were acceptable.

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1268.
Id.
Id.
Berkelman, 501 F.2d at 1268.
No. 80 Civ. 6761, 1986 WL 4894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 22, 1986).
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *13.
Id.
Yonkers Bd. Of Ed., 1986 WL 4894, at *31.
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STATE APPROACH
A.

New York Court of Appeals

The New York Court of Appeals has not addressed the specific issue of a sibling preference based admission policy, however the
Court has reviewed the Equal Protection Clause. Although the facts
in People v. Parker110 are not exactly the same as the facts of Matter
of R.B., the court in Matter of R.B. addressed the Equal Protection
Clause. The court stated that “[t]he [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause
does not mandate absolute equality of treatment but merely prescribes that, absent a fundamental interest or suspect classification, a
legislative classification be rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose.”111
In 1976, the New York Court of Appeals, in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center,112 also looked at the Equal Protection Clause in
relation to a medical school’s admission policy.113 The plaintiff applied to Downstate Medical Center, the defendant, for admission to
the 1974 to 1975 program.114 The admission committee gave each
applicant a “screening code,” which determined whether the applicant would be considered for a personal interview; however, persons
that claimed to be from a minority group were given a preliminary
screening by the committee regardless of their “screening code.”115
The minority applicants that were interviewed exceeded the amount
of other applicants by 12%.116 The admission committee looked at
whether the minority applicant was financially or educationally disadvantaged, and the committee placed a high priority on those factors.117 The plaintiff was placed on the second waiting list.118 There
were sixty-six minority students that were accepted to the program,
and the plaintiff had a higher Medical College Admission Test
(“MCAT”) score than every one of the accepted minority students.119
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

359 N.E.2d 348 (N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 350-51.
348 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 542.
Id. at 540.
Id.
Id.
Alevy, 348 N.E.2d at 541.
Id.
Id. at 542.
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The plaintiff claimed that the admission policy that “g[ave] less qualified minority applicants a greater opportunity for acceptance [wa]s
violative of the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause.”120 The plaintiff urged
that the strict scrutiny test be applied in this case, but the court refused to do so.121 The court decided to apply a middle ground analysis between the strict scrutiny test and the rationally-related test.122
The court stated,
In determining whether a substantial State interest underlies a preferential treatment policy, courts should
inquire whether the policy has a substantial basis in
actuality, and is not merely conjectural. At a minimum, the State-sponsored scheme must further some
legitimate, articulated governmental purpose. However, the interest need not be urgent, paramount or compelling. Thus, to satisfy the substantial interest requirement, it need be found that, on balance, the gain
to be derived from the preferential policy outweighs
its possible detrimental effects.123
The court stated that if there was a substantial interest, it must look at
whether the objectives of the policy could be achieved alternatively.124 Although the court did not determine the ultimate issue in this
case because the plaintiff did not set out a primia facie case, the court
did set out a test to review an admission policy.125
B.

Lower Courts

The lower courts in New York have reviewed the Equal Protection Clause. In Bradstreet v. Sobol,126 the plaintiff’s daughter was
home schooled and was not enrolled in a public school.127 Her
daughter wanted to participate in the local school’s interscholastic
sports program.128 However, the school did not allow her to partici120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id. at 542.
Alevy, 348 N.E.2d at 544.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 547.
650 N.Y.S.2d 402 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1996).
Id. at 403.
Id.
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pate because in order to be a part of the school’s interscholastic sports
program, the child had to be enrolled in their school.129 The court reviewed the issue of the eligibility requirement based on whether there
was a “rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose” because the
daughter was classified as a non-suspect class.130 The daughter’s
classification was based on her lack of enrollment in the public
school where she wanted to participate in the sports program. 131 The
defendant’s justification for requiring enrollment was that it promoted school spirit and loyalty.132 The court found nothing irrational
about the requirement and held that there was no violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.133 The court reasoned that it was “rational
to require that a student who seeks to represent a school in interscholastic athletic competition be enrolled in the school . . . [and the]
plaintiff ha[d] no legitimate claim that her daughter [wa]s an appropriate representative of the public school for competition with other
schools.”134
The Supreme Court in New York County addressed the issue
of equal protection in In re Downey.135 The court held that equal protection “does not require that all persons be dealt with identically.”136
However, it does require “that distinction among classes must be reasonable.”137 Although the Supreme Court and Appellate Division of
New York did not address admission policies, the courts analysis did
review the Equal Protection Clause.
V.

EVALUATION

After evaluating the federal approach and the New York State
approach on the issue of an admission policy under the Equal Protection Clause, it is reasonable to conclude the court in Matter of R.B.
followed the proper level of scrutiny when determining whether the
sibling preference admission policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause. New York courts have dealt with the Equal Protection
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id.
Id.
Bradstreet, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.
340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
Id. at 690.
Id.
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Clause, but Matter of R.B. was the first case in which the addressed
an admission policy to a G&T program. Matter of R.B. is important
because the court identified that the admission policy was within the
DOE’s discretion and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.138
The plaintiffs in Matter of R.B. brought this case because they
claimed the DOE’s admission policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause by giving preference to children with siblings already in the
program.139 The court cited Korematsu as authority to state that the
plaintiffs’ children were not to be classified as a suspect class because “[t]hat classification refers to a party’s racial or national background.”140 The court in Grutter stated that the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit different types of arbitrary admission procedures, such as “legacy preferences.”141 The court in Matter of R.B.
correctly ruled that the sibling preference did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because, as stated in Grutter, the classification was
not based on race, but instead was analogous to a legacy preference.
Further, Parents Involved is distinguishable from Matter of
R.B. because the Court in Parents Involved reviewed the case under
strict scrutiny, whereas the court in Matter of R.B. reviewed the case
based on the rational basis test.142 The Court in Parents Involved reviewed the case under strict scrutiny because the student assignment
plan was based on race.143 The court in Matter of R.B. appropriately
applied the rational basis test instead of reviewing the case under
strict scrutiny because the admission policy was based on sibling
preference, not race. The New York Court of Appeals in Parker addressed the issue of the level of scrutiny to be used by courts.144 The
court in Matter of R.B. properly followed the precedent set out in
Parker because there was no fundamental interest or suspect classification.145 Thus, the court looked at whether the classification was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.146 Additionally, in
Bradstreet the court reviewed the case based on the rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose and determined that the school’s
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *17.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *15.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-80, 45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73, 74, 78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
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policy promoted school spirit and loyalty.147 Therefore, in Matter of
R.B., the court properly recognized that the admission policy rationally furthered a legitimate purpose by showing that the policy intended
to relieve the burden on families with two or more siblings having to
attend two different schools.148
The court’s decision in Matter of R.B. is consistent with the
Court’s recognition in Berkelman that there was no perfect determination of who could and could not benefit from the program. 149 In
Matter of R.B., the court correctly determined that the admission policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the court followed the precedent of the Southern District of New York, when it
upheld an admission policy that included a sibling preference in Yonkers Board of Education.150
VI.

CONCLUSION

This case was brought up to the Appellate Division, First Department.151 This court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the
sibling preference policy did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.152 This court followed the same reasoning stating that “the policy
‘rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose.’ ”153
The court’s decision in Matter of R.B. was a fair one. The
court correctly applied the rational basis test to determine whether the
sibling preference of the admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. Although this case was not decided by the New York
Court of Appeals, it will have future implications. No matter the specific admission program preference, future courts will be able to apply the same test as this court. The courts will be able to review the
admission policy preference and determine if it has a legitimate state
purpose, just as the court in Matter of R.B. did. This court’s decision
was not outrageous or inconsistent that it would be overturned and
not followed by future courts.

147

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
149
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
150
See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
151
R.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of the City of New York, 981 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1st
Dep’t 2014).
152
Id. at 414.
153
Id.
148
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